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1 This paper expresses in briefer, but hopefully clearer form, my views in Fuller, 2002.  Some short passages, as well as some examples, have been drawn from that 
article.   
We attribute psychological states and intentional 
actions to others.  We also predict such states and actions 
and explain them.  I attribute to Fred the belief that that 
mountain in the distance is the Schneeberg as well as the 
thought that it would be pleasant to climb it.  I predict that 
later in the week when there is some free time Fred will 
form the intention to climb the mountain that very 
afternoon.  And when one morning later in the week Fred 
says, “Let’s drive to Puchberg [at the foot of the 
Schneeberg] this afternoon,” I have no problem explaining 
what is up:  Fred has Schneeberg plans.  Further, we often 
do this spontaneously, effortlessly, and, in the majority of 
cases, successfully.   
How do we do this?  How do we attribute, predict, 
and explain the psychological states and intentional 
actions of others?  This seems to be mainly a question for 
psychology, or, more broadly, cognitive science.  Let us 
call it the ‘cognitive-science’ question.  In the last fifteen 
years or so there has been a lively dispute over the answer 
to the cognitive-science question (Davies, 1995a and 
Davies, 1995b contain representative articles).  The 
theory-of-mind theory (TT) holds that we handle the above 
psychological phenomena by deploying a psychological 
theory, which will contain, among other things, familiar 
commonsense generalizations. The simulation theory (ST), 
on the other hand, denies that we employ psychological 
generalizations; rather, we exploit the similarities between 
others and ourselves and we simulate them.  We put 
ourselves in the other’s shoes, see what we would think or 
do, and go on to infer that the other will think or do the 
same.  Turning my gaze in the direction of Fred’s, I think, 
“It would be nice to climb that mountain,” and go on to infer 
that Fred thinks so as well.   
Interestingly enough, the recent dispute grows out 
of a much more traditional dispute.  Over a half century 
ago, in his brief foray into the philosophy of history, Carl 
Hempel held that scientific historical explanation “can be 
achieved only by means of suitable general hypotheses, or 
by theories.” He attacked “the familiar view that genuine 
explanation in history is obtained by a method which 
characteristically distinguishes the social from the natural 
sciences, namely, the method of empathetic 
understanding” (Hempel, 1959, p.352).  To use the method 
of empathy the historian must imagine himself in the place 
of the historical figures whose thoughts and actions he 
wants to explain and see how “he himself would act under 
the given conditions” (pp. 352-3).  In other words, although 
Hempel does not use the expression, the historian must 
“simulate” the person he is studying.  Such a procedure, 
according to Hempel, “may sometimes prove heuristically 
helpful,” but it does not establish the “soundness” of a 
historical explanation.  Nor is such a method indispensable 
for historical explanation (p. 353).  Hempel’s attack on the 
method of empathy was directed to thinkers in the 
verstehen tradition, such as Dilthey and Collinwood. 
Hempel is not really concerned with the question 
of what historians, or ordinary people, do.  Rather, he is 
concerned in the main with the following question: Whether 
or not historians or ordinary folk do use the method of 
empathy, or simulation, is such a method a good method 
(a permissible, justifiable, or even indispensable method) 
for arriving at truths about the psychological states and 
intentional actions of historical figures or ordinary people.  
The traditional dispute pitting theory against 
empathy/simulation, in which we can count Hempel as a 
representative participant, is thus different from the 
cognitive-science dispute.  Let us call the traditional 
dispute the ‘normative’ dispute.  
The traditional normative question seems out of 
fashion today.  I want to revive it.  My question, then, is 
this. In the light of the recent cognitive-science dispute 
what can be said in answer to the normative question of 
whether the method of empathy/simulation can provide us 
with a good method of acquiring knowledge about others’ 
thoughts and actions?  I shall argue that the cognitive-
science discussion, not surprisingly, can shed some light 
on the old normative dispute, but that that the light that it 
sheds leads us to some pessimistic conclusions about at 
least the short-term prospects for empathy/simulation as a 
good method.   
 
1 The old normative question is that of whether in 
addition to the theory method used in the natural sciences 
--- the method of theory construction, testing, and 
application --- there is also a method of verstehen, 
empathy, or simulation that can be used to acquire 
knowledge in the human sciences.  But what is a method 
of empathy or simulation?  Here the cognitive-science 
discussion has been very helpful.  A representative and 
useful cognitive-science characterization of simulation is 
Goldman’s.  Simulation involves the investigator’s going 
through a succession of states that is isomorphic to the 
actual succession of states of her subject.  Further, the 
investigator’s succession of states must be “process” 
rather than “theory” driven, that is, driven by psychological 
mechanisms similar to those of her subject that are 
deployed but not represented in her mind (Goldman, 1995, 
p. 85). 
Consider an example (following Harris, 1995, pp. 
210-11).  I am asked to predict whether my friend Peter, 
from Michigan, will think that the following sentence is 
good English: “The piano weighs this pound.”  I reply 
spontaneously, or at least with little conscious thought, “Of 
course not!”  Here it does seem plausible that I do use 
simulation along the lines suggested above.  I repeat 
silently and represent to myself the sentence about the 
piano.  This input is then processed by linguistic 
mechanisms that I share with Peter but which I do not 
represent and theorize about --- I am not a theoretical 
linguist and at least in this case do not have much of a clue 
as to what relevant rule is operating. Finally, the output of 
the process, which I use to make my prediction about 
Mental Simulation: the Old-Fashioned Dispute - Gary Fuller 
 
 
 60 
Peter, is my thought that the sentence is indeed 
grammatically deviant. 
Contemporary ST is a cognitive-science account of 
how we do handle psychological attributions, irrespective 
of whether we know we are using simulation or not.  
Simulation as a normative method, however, must meet 
higher standards.  Scientific methods of inquiry, after all, 
should consist of a set of explicit requirements that the 
investigator can ascertain to have been met.  Can 
Goldman’s account of simulation be turned into such a 
normative method?  It seems that it can.  A scientific 
method of simulation would have to meet the following 
requirements, among others.  The investigator must have 
good reason to believe that her psychological mechanisms 
are relevantly similar to those of her subject.  She also 
must have good reason to believe that her inputs and 
those of her subject are relevantly similar.  And finally, she 
must have good reason to believe that her output state is 
produced by her psychological mechanisms and not by 
some theoretical inference. 
The good news is that there is some reason for 
believing that these requirements for simulation as a 
normative method can be met in many cases.  A few years 
ago I wanted to get my sister a present for her birthday.  I 
explicitly put the method of simulation into practice.  I was 
thinking of getting her Glen Gould’s version of the late 
Brahms Intermezzi.  But would she like the CD?  I had, 
and still have, inductive reasons for believing that our 
musical psychologies are similar.  She and I had the same 
musical education when we were young, including the 
same piano teachers and the same exposure to classical 
recordings.  We also have tended over the years to agree 
in our likes and dislikes of classical pieces of music in a 
wide range of cases and circumstances.  I exposed myself 
to an input that was obviously relevantly similar to her 
future input: I bought a copy of the Gould recording and 
listened to it.  I was enthralled.  I predicted that she would 
be as well.  She was.  The example of my sister’s present 
and many others, however anecdotal, do give us some 
reason for thinking that simulation can provide a justifiable, 
and even a sometimes practically indispensable, method 
for arriving at knowledge of others’ psychological states.  
 
2 I said earlier that the cognitive-science 
discussion leads to some pessimistic conclusions about 
simulation as a normative method.  After the optimism 
above, how can that be?  What is the problem?  The 
problem is that the type of simulation about which there is 
some cause for optimism is actual (or actual-situation) 
simulation in which the inputs and outputs of the simulation 
are ‘real.’  In the case of my sister’s present, for example, I 
really do listen to the Gould CD and enjoy it.  Opportunities 
for using actual simulation in attributing psychological 
states in everyday life, and certainly in history, are quite 
limited.  A more comprehensive and significant account of 
simulation will have to include off-line (or pretense-driven 
off-line) simulation, in which at least some of the inputs are 
pretend ones (see Stich and Nichols, 1997).  Indeed, ST 
has been mainly concerned with off-line simulation. 
In off-line simulation the inputs, or at least some of 
them, are pretend ones.  (And, of course, so are the 
outputs.)  When I explain what Fred is up to in wanting to 
drive to Puchberg, I may actually believe that it is Aspang 
that is at the foot of the Schneeberg; nevertheless, I form 
the pretend belief that it is Puchberg.  Or, suppose that I 
am told that Mrs. Smith has just sat down at a table in her 
local restaurant and is being handed the menu by a new 
waiter, when she notices a distinctive scar on the waiter’s 
hand and thereby recognizes him as a wanted criminal.  I 
try to predict what she will do by forming, among other 
states, the pretend beliefs that I am in the restaurant and 
that the waiter is a wanted person (adopted from Heal, 
1996b, p.79).  Finally, the historian, in trying to explain 
Caesar’s famous return to Rome, forms the pretend belief 
that the Rubicon is in front of her.  Or at least this is so if 
the supporters of ST are right. 
Off-line simulation, it seems, can also be 
reformulated into an explicit method with similar 
requirements to that of actual simulation, although two 
important points need to be stressed in this case.  First, to 
get himself into the initial pretend state, the off-line 
simulator must focus on the outside world.  To form the 
pretend belief about the waiter with the scar, I must 
imagine:  There is a waiter with a scar in the restaurant.  
Second, to insure that the pretend inputs are being 
handled in a process rather than a theory driven way, the 
simulator must ask not “What would I do if I believed the 
waiter was a wanted criminal?” but rather “What is the 
thing to do in a situation like this?” 
It is here that we start getting into trouble.  The 
cognitive-science discussion has shown that off-line 
simulation, or better, off-line attempted simulation, does 
not work in many cases.  It may work in some cases of off-
line simulation of perceptual inputs (imagine that the mouth 
of a ‘smiley’ face is turned downwards), but it clearly does 
not work in others (imagine that you are looking at two 
equal lines encased by pairs of wedges arranged in the 
familiar Muller-Lyer way).  It does not work in predicting 
what people, including oneself, will do in Milgram 
experiments.  Stich and Nichols have provided some 
evidence that it does not work in predicting the behavior of 
subjects in the Langer lottery experiment.  In that 
experiment subjects buy a lottery ticket and are later given 
the opportunity to sell the ticket.  Subjects who initially are 
just handed their ticket are willing to sell it for less than 
those who initially chose their own ticket (Stich and 
Nichols, 1997, p. 311).  In other words, even if the 
investigator shares psychological mechanisms with the 
subject and her pretend inputs have similar contents to the 
actual inputs of the subject, the two outputs may be 
different.           
What turns this initial trouble into bad news is that, 
at least at present, no one has a systematic account, or 
even a good sketch, of how to draw the distinction 
between cases where off-line simulation works and those 
where it does not.  Jane Heal’s view that off-line simulation 
works for rational transitions between states with 
propositional contents is as good as any (Heal, 1996b, p. 
56).  There are, however, at least three serious problems 
with it.  First, the rational-irrational distinction is far from 
clear.  Are the subjects in the Langer experiment really 
irrational?  Second, even if the rational-irrational distinction 
can be clarified, there may be no easy way to apply it on 
the basis of recognizable features.  Assuming Heal is right, 
if I am to make a defensible decision of whether or not to 
use off-line simulation to predict what Langer subjects will 
do, I will need to know beforehand whether rational or 
irrational processes will be involved.  Finally, there may 
well be many ‘rational’ cases where off-line simulation 
does not work.  I suspect that it will not work in many 
cases of predicting emotions, even where the emotions are 
ordinarily thought to be quite rational.  Again, it may not 
work in cases of predicting the results of reasoning which 
involves a subtle weighing of evidence.  This ignorance 
about how to draw the distinction between good and bad 
uses of off-line simulation gives rise to doubts about 
almost any particular use of off-line simulation as a 
scientific method.  Of any particular use of off-line 
simulation I do not know whether it is of a type that is likely 
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to work or not, and hence I am unjustified in using it on that 
occasion.  
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